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We discuss the use of event studies in macroeconomics and finance,
arguing that many important macro-finance questions can only be
answered using event studies with high-frequency financial market data.
We provide a broad picture of the use of event studies, along with their
limitations. As examples, we study financial markets’ responses to spe-
cific events that help address questions such as the slope of bond demand
functions and the efficacy of central bank liquidity programs. We also
study the change in financial market responses to news in payrolls and
unemployment in response to former Fed Chairman Greenspan’s state-
ment that payrolls are more informative.
1 INTRODUCTION
Applied economists have a harder job than natural scientists because natural
scientists get to do controlled experiments. Controlled experiments can give
clear-cut evidence on, for example, the benefit of giving a patient a particular
treatment rather than a placebo. Alas, we can seldom do anything like this in
economics. But there are some examples where fate gives economists a
pseudo-natural experiment. The controlled release of economic news is an
important example. In the minutes before the news is released, its content is
unknown to financial market participants. After the news comes out, with
efficient markets, the information content is quickly impounded into asset
prices (French and Roll, 1986). The jump in asset prices in a small window
around the announcement reflects the causal impact of the news, and likely
little else. Hence, the lumpy manner in which news is released to the public is
a source of identification, as discussed more formally in Faust et al. (2007).
This identification approach is known as the event study methodology and is
the focus of this paper.
An event study looks at the reaction of the financial markets to news.
This is of course a task that journalists undertake every day; the event study
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methodology does this systematically. It requires two key ingredients. First
the researcher must be able to measure the ‘news’—the part of the event that
changes the information set of market participants. Then, the researcher has
to be able to measure the effect of this news on a relevant asset price. The task
is best undertaken with very high-frequency data, because in a small enough
window around the news announcement, nothing other than the announce-
ment should be affecting asset prices. This is what makes it resemble a
controlled experiment. With longer windows, other shocks will matter as
well.
In this paper we provide a review of the event study methodology and
give some new examples that shed light on important topical questions such
as the effects of central bank liquidity programs.
2 EVENT STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW
There are two reasons why we use event studies. The first reason is because we
are interested in the financial markets’ reactions in their own right. An
example of this is the study of the effectiveness of central banks’ large-scale
asset purchases and other liquidity provisioning measures during and after
the recent financial crisis. The financial markets’ reaction to these announce-
ments can be used to measure their effects. The second reason why we use
event studies has to do with shortcomings of the available macroeconomic
data and econometric techniques.
By and large macroeconomics is in a state of observational equivalence,
where a great number of disparate models fit a small number of macroeco-
nomic stylized facts roughly equally well. Taylor and Wieland (2012) show
that models with very different microfoundations and policy implications fit
the current canon of macroeconomic stylized facts about as well as each
other. Hence macroeconomic facts and standard macroeconomic data sets
cannot be used to distinguish between the models.
The literature has moved in two directions to overcome this problem;
both involve looking at more data. The first direction is to use microeconomic
data to make statements about macroeconomic models. This is why we see
many recent studies using individual household and firm decision data in
assessing macroeconomic models. The second direction, which is the focus of
the current paper, is to look at financial markets both because financial
markets offer a very rich set of data and because by the nature of financial
markets these data are very amenable to manipulation in ways that allow
backing out of market participants’ expectations about the future.
A simple example here is whether inflation targeting works. Inflation
targeting is supposed to anchor inflation expectations. Inflation itself will still
be subject to shocks and will deviate from the target. Nonetheless, with an
inflation target, the central bank ought to ensure that such deviations are
temporary. It is hard to answer the question of whether inflation targeting
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worked in the countries that adopted this regime because one needs a long
time to see whether the nature of the inflation process has indeed changed. If
inflation targeting, for example, is to bring inflation down to its target level
within three years, one would need 30 years of data to have just 10 independ-
ent observations. Financial market data, on the other hand, provide an
almost continuous reading of inflation-related expectations at various
maturities in the future, and these can be analyzed in event studies to see how
news about inflation today affects expectations of inflation in the distant
future.
When the object of interest is the behavior of financial markets, a high-
frequency event study is the natural tool of analysis as this method allows
for fairly straightforward identification. A quarterly vector autoregression
(VAR) may be sufficient to study the relationship between GDP or inflation
and monetary policy. But if another financial variable (say, stock prices) is
added to the mix, there exists no ordering of the variables that could reason-
ably identify the monetary policy effect on the asset price. As both monetary
policy and asset prices are forward-looking, they react to each other within
the quarter. In contrast, assuming that monetary policy does not react to
financial market developments on the day of the monetary policy announce-
ment, which is very reasonable, allows us to give a causal interpretation to
any correlation that can be observed between policy actions and asset price
reactions on the days of monetary policy announcements. This is the essence
of the event study methodology.
3 METHODOLOGY
The modeling set-up is a system of two simultaneous structural equations
that relate an asset price and a macro variable or policy action to each other:
Δ Δa x zt t t t= + +α ε (1)
Δ Δx a zt t t t= + +β γ η (2)
where Δat the change in the asset price, Δxt is the news (the surprise in the data
release or policy action), zt is a vector of other variables affecting both the
asset price and the news and εt and ηt are uncorrelated error terms. The
parameter of interest is α but it is not identified because both variables
depend on each other.
Here is where high-frequency data can help. When one looks at a short
enough window, say a day or even an hour around an event of interest, it
becomes easy to argue that the variance of zt and εt are small relative to the
variance of the shock to the news, ηt. Then, equation (1), can simply be
estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of Δat on Δxt.
The equation is estimated over windows that include an announcement.
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Estimation of equation (1) may include a constant, but it is typically not
significant, and sometimes dropped. White (1980) standard errors are gener-
ally used to allow for heteroskedasticity, but no allowance for serial correla-
tion is made, as asset returns in successive announcement windows exhibit
minimal autocorrelation.
The argument for estimating equation (1) by OLS is actually quite a bit
stronger, however. The news that comes out is typically something that by
construction can only depend on lagged asset returns. For example, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decision is made late on the
morning of the meeting day and then released at 2:15. No asset price move-
ment that afternoon could ever change the decision (nor could it change
expectations made as of before the meeting). Similarly, the employment
report that comes out on the first Friday of the month pertains to the labor
market in the previous month. No asset price shocks on the day of the release
can ever affect it. So in many contexts, assuming that there is no other shock
before the announcement but within the event study window affecting the
agents’ expectations about the news (an assumption that will almost certainly
hold in short windows), we can replace equation (2) with
Δ Δx a zt t j t j t= + +− −β γ η
where j denotes some lag length that depends on the particular context. Then,
equation (1) can safely be estimated by OLS, even if the variances of zt and εt
are not necessarily small relative to the variance of the shock to the news.
3.1 Identification through Heteroskedasticity
Sometimes, though, one may wish to estimate equations (1) and (2) and the
researcher may feel that there is some risk of endogeneity bias from estimat-
ing (1) alone by OLS. In this case, there is an elegant generalization of the
event study approach considered by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack
(2003, 2004, 2005) which depends on the observation that the variance of εt is
the same at all times but the variance of the news is higher on news release
times compared with non-news windows. The heteroskedasticity caused by
the news timing can then be used to separate the effect of news on asset prices
from usual background noise which affects both variables. This is called
heteroskedasticity-based identification. Rigobon and Sack have used this to
study the effect of monetary policy on asset prices and since then many
studies have used the same idea in many different contexts including
Ehrmann et al. (2011) on cross-country and cross-market interlinkages and
Duran et al. (2012) on financial market responses to monetary policy in an
emerging market. A useful feature of this approach is that it does not rely on
actually measuring the news—it is much easier to know when the variance of
the news is higher than to actually be able to measure the news.
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News releases are long and contain a great deal of information, including
sectoral detail and in some cases revisions to previously released data. The
headline surprise will not be the only news to come out of the announcement,
hence methods not directly measuring the surprise may be unable to differ-
entiate between asset price responses to different components of the news.
Gürkaynak et al. (2012) discuss this issue, and propose a remedy, which is
related to identification through heteroskedasticity. We do not go into this
methodological debate in this paper but rather talk about the economics to be
learned from the use of event studies regardless of whether they are carried
out via OLS or via heteroskedasticity-based identification.
3.2 Caveats and Limitations
For every question to be answered using an event study, there are several
crucial caveats and limitations:
1. The data must come out in a controlled manner and at a precise time. If,
for example, the news leaks ahead of time, then the event study method-
ology cannot be used.
2. We must have good measures of the expectations. Failing to condition on
the news, i.e. not isolating the expected component of any release, will
lead to an attenuation bias in econometric work as forward-looking
financial markets will have responded to the expected part already. It is
therefore important that the news capture a change in the information set
of market participants. That is why the literature often uses the phrase
the ‘surprise’ component of news or data releases—a surprise by defini-
tion captures a change in the information set.
3. We can only measure the effects of the news on asset prices (and on
expectations that are embedded in those asset prices) that are available at
high frequency.
4. Event studies provide information on market participants’ expectations,
but not on actual outcomes. For example, using an event study we may
learn whether market participants think that a newly announced policy
will help bring inflation to a certain level but not whether the policy will
actually deliver that outcome.
5. Finally, event studies provide information on market participants’ beliefs
under risk neutrality.1 News could affect risk premia as well—the effects
on expectations and risk premia cannot readily be disentangled.
1In fact, the condition is much weaker. Event studies work well under risk aversion as long as risk
pricing does not change in response to the news release. As the asset price in (1) is
differenced, the levels of any risk premia are differenced out. Changes in premia not
systematically related to the surprise will be in εt.
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Notwithstanding these caveats, there are many cases where the structure
of news announcements allow us to measure causal effects of news on finan-
cial market participants’ beliefs, assuming rational expectations and
unchanging risk pricing.
3.3 The Window Size
Generally, the window around the data release that researchers use should be
as small as possible. Indeed, the widespread availability of intradaily data has
been central in recent empirical work on event studies, as the evidence sug-
gests that the jump in conditional mean following a news announcement is
done within about 10 minutes (Andersen et al., 2003). There are two reasons
why it is generally better to use small windows to estimate the reactions to
news:
1. It reduces the danger of any feedback in the estimation of equation (1).
2. Even if the window is small enough that there is no concern about
endogeneity in a regression of Δat on Δxt, a smaller window will reduce
the error variance while leaving the variance of the right-hand-side vari-
able unchanged. Improving the signal-to-noise ratio will then make the
coefficient more precisely estimated.
In assessing the effects of news announcements on major markets, it is
now typical to use roughly 20 minutes windows bracketing release times (five
minutes before the release to 15 minutes after). Any gains to using smaller
windows are likely to be slight, and there are potential downsides to making
the windows smaller still. In some markets, illiquid trading or even lack of
data availability might motivate using larger windows. Bauer (2012), for
example, argues that Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) incorpo-
rate news somewhat more slowly than nominal bonds and hence the mea-
surement window must be large enough to capture TIPS updating.
4 NEWS AND MARKETS FOR EVENT STUDIES
In this section we provide a short and very selective survey of some of the key
questions addressed using event studies and the news and markets used to
do so.
The event study literature has its roots in the seminal works of Roley
(1982), Cutler et al. (1989), Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and
Remolona (1997, 1999) and Kuttner (2001). The literature generally uses
survey expectations of data releases such as inflation, unemployment and the
GDP growth rate together with the actual released values of these variables to
calculate surprises on the days of the releases. One can obtain a long time
series of survey expectations for data releases from sources such as Action
Economics (formerly Money Market Services) and Bloomberg. These survey
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expectations are surely not perfect measures of expectations (they are at least
somewhat stale), but nonetheless have good properties as expectations
proxies. Balduzzi et al. (2001) find that they pass simple forecast efficiency
tests and outperform simple benchmarks. While survey expectations of the
target federal funds rate to be announced at the next FOMC meeting exist, it
is generally thought to be preferable to measure these expectations from
federal funds futures contracts instead (Kuttner, 2001).
These measures of surprises have been used to answer many different
questions in the literature. Kuttner (2001) found that monetary policy has
sizable effects on longer-term interest rates. Andersen et al. (2003) examined
reactions of exchange rates to macroeconomic news and found significant
relationships, which was a major breakthrough as exchange rates had previ-
ously been seen as unrelated to any macroeconomic fundamentals: past,
present or future (Meese and Rogoff, 1983). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)
examined the effects of monetary policy shocks on stock prices. Boyd et al.
(2005) found that higher-than-expected unemployment rate announcements
cause stock prices to rise during expansions, but not during recessions.
Unemployment news has two offsetting effects: on future dividends and on
discount rates. The latter seems to be dominant most of the time, but not in
recessions. Gürkaynak et al. (2005a) looked at the long forward interest
rates’ response to data releases and monetary policy surprises to see whether
inflation expectations are anchored. With anchored inflation expectations,
surprises about the state of the economy today should be uninformative
about inflation at steady state, say 10 years’ hence. That means that 10-year-
forward interest rates should be unresponsive to macroeconomic develop-
ments today. However, in the USA, far-ahead forward interest rates are
responsive to data surprises, in ways consistent with market participants not
knowing the inflation target and updating their beliefs about steady-state
inflation based on what they learn today.
The introduction of inflation-indexed bonds has been a boon for mac-
roeconomic research in general, and for the event study approach in particu-
lar. These markets, which existed in the UK since the early 1980s, began in
the USA in 1997. The difference between nominal and indexed bonds’ inter-
est rates, called inflation compensation or breakeven inflation, measures
inflation expectations under risk neutrality. One can construct an inflation
compensation term structure and look at the responses of the long end of that
term structure directly, which gives a cleaner read on long-term inflation
expectations (Gürkaynak et al., 2010b).
Gürkaynak et al. (2010a) do this for the USA, the UK and Sweden and
find that far-forward inflation compensation is unresponsive to data releases
in Sweden and also in the UK after the independence of the Bank of England,
but does respond to data releases in the USA and also in the UK before
central bank independence. This suggests that a credible inflation target does
indeed succeed in anchoring long-run inflation expectations. Beechey et al.
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(2011) do a similar exercise for the euro area using inflation swaps instead of
inflation compensation. Galati et al. (2011) study whether inflation expecta-
tion responsiveness to data has changed as concerns about fiscal
sustainability have mounted during the recent crisis, and find that it has not.
Another application of event studies is with political data. Snowberg
et al. (2012) provide interesting examples of event studies involving political
events, including the stock market reaction to changes in perceptions about
who will win on an election night. A particularly striking political event study
is the work of Rigobon and Sack (2005), showing that increases in the
probability of the USA entering war against Afghanistan in early 2003 led to
lower stock prices and higher oil futures quotes. This paper also contains a
nice application of heteroskedasticity-based identification. La Ferrara and
Guidolin (2007), again using event studies—this time from Angola—show
that war may lead to higher stock prices if it here are entry barriers due to the
conflict.
4.1 Quantitative Easing Event Studies
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, with short-term interest rates stuck at
the effective zero lower bound, the Fed and the Bank of England have
undertaken large-scale asset purchases, commonly referred to as quantitative
easing. The European Central Bank has also engaged in bond purchases,
although within a quite different framework. The usefulness of these actions
is a subject of vigorous debate. Low-frequency data will not help because of
endogeneity issues. The recovery in most countries has been weak, yet that is
clearly not evidence against the usefulness of unconventional policy. The
event study methodology can be used to identify the effects of these and other
unconventional policy actions on asset prices, which is at least an important
part of the transmissions mechanism to the broader economy.
Authors using the event study framework to examine the effects
of quantitative easing announcements include Doh (2010), D’Amico and
King (2013), D’Amico et al. (2012), Gagnon et al. (2011), Neely (2010),
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), Joyce and
Tong (2012) and Wright (2012). Also, Swanson (2011) reexamined Operation
Twist from the 1960s using a modern event study perspective, and compared
it to the unconventional monetary policies presently being employed by the
Federal Reserve. This body of work collectively establishes very convincingly
that unconventional monetary policy announcements had material, albeit
perhaps small, effects on asset prices.
The initial announcements of purchases of government bonds by the Fed
and the Bank of England, both in March 2009, were complete surprises,
which is very helpful from the event study perspective. They were followed by
large drops in bond yields.
Since August 2010, the FOMC has generally signaled its intentions
about quantitative easing plans to markets before the actual meeting
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announcements. This makes the event study methodology harder to use,
because the methodology relies on the information coming out in a lumpy
manner. But there was a modest surprise at the September 2012 meeting. At
this meeting, the FOMC announced more purchases of mortgage backed
securities (MBS), but not of Treasuries, whereas the expectation had appar-
ently been from some mix of the two. Following the announcement, MBS
yields fell while Treasury yields rose.
D’Amico and King (2013) and D’Amico et al. (2012) carefully study the
cross-section of announcement effects on different bond yields (at the indi-
vidual bond level) with the objective of shedding light on the channels
whereby quantitative easing announcements affect yields. One possibility is
the duration channel: purchases of long-term Treasuries reduces the duration
of the stock of bonds in the market, and drive up the price of long-duration
assets. Another is the local supply channel: markets are segmented and
investors have demand for Treasury securities of a particular maturity.2 The
FOMC announcement of 10 August 2010 was particularly useful in disen-
tangling these two channels. At 2:15 PM, the FOMC announced that principal
payments from agency securities would be reinvested in Treasury securities.
At 2:45 PM, the New York Fed gave a breakdown of the maturities of the
Treasury securities that would be purchased. These were to be concentrated
in the 2- to 10-year sector. This staggered timing of the revelation of in-
formation may be unusual central banking practice, but it was very helpful to
academic research as information about duration and local supply (which
securities would be targeted) came out separately, allowing two event studies
to identify both effects. D’Amico et al. (2012) found that both the duration
and local supply channels were present, but that the latter seemed to be
quantitatively more important.
The bottom line from event study analysis of the impact of quantitative
easing on asset prices is that there is a remarkable degree of consensus. All the
papers agree that quantitative easing announcements mattered, and they
agree on the sign and the even the order of magnitude of the effect. That’s
quite rare in macroeconomics but is consistent with other event study evid-
ence on the effects of changing supply on yields. However, from an asset
pricing theory point of view, the effects are surprising. Large as these asset
purchases are, they are a trivial share of global fixed income markets, and
conventional finance theory would hold that their effects on interest rates
2Another possibility is the signaling channel, whereby asset purchase announcements lead agents
to conclude that the federal funds rate will remain at the zero lower bound for longer.
Federal Reserve announcements of large-scale asset purchases had large effects on 10-year-
ahead forward rates, and we find it difficult to imagine that the announcements had
material effects on expectations of the federal funds rate at that horizon. On the other hand,
the signaling channel is likely important when analyzing the effects of forward rate guid-
ance, such as expressing the intention to keep the federal funds rate at zero through late
2014 (announced at the January 2012 FOMC meeting).
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should be negligible. A significant practical contribution of the event study
methodology is that it has demonstrated that this view is unambiguously
wrong, which is an important contribution to our empirical understanding of
financial markets. At the same time, an important limitation of the event
study approach to measuring the effects of quantitative easing is that it
is harder to know what effects the announcements had on real economic
activity.
An important question in quantitative easing event study analysis (and
indeed in event studies more broadly) is that it is hard to know the persistence
of the effects. On the one hand, the reactions that are documented in these
event studies are to announcements of future purchases, not to the actual
purchases themselves, and so they cannot be dismissed as transitory micro-
structure effects. On the other hand simply totting up the announcement
effects of news about asset purchases—as though they were all permanent—
gives big effects. We are a little suspicious of this since in a preferred habitat
model, there are natural mechanisms that might cause the effects to wear off
over time. One is that quantitative easing may make the economy stronger
than would otherwise have been the case, driving interest rates back up. A
second is that quantitative easing may induce more corporate issuance of
long-term bonds (Stein, 2012), which would in turn also tend to push long-
term rates higher. A third is that frictions may make arbitrage capital slow-
moving—and thus better able to offset the impact of preferred habitat
investors in the long-run than in the short-run (Mitchell et al., 2007; Duffie,
2010). Wright (2012) uses a VAR methodology to estimate the persistence of
quantitative easing effects and obtains wide confidence intervals, but his
point estimates indicate that the effects wear off quite fast.
4.2 More on Measuring Monetary Policy Surprises
Kuttner (2001) showed how to measure the surprise components of FOMC
announcements concerning the target federal funds rate. But even before the
Fed reached the zero lower bound, the announcement about the target
federal funds rate was not the only important feature of FOMC
announcements—the statement mattered as well. And of course since Decem-
ber 2008, there have been no surprises to the target federal funds rate. Only
the statement and quantitative easing announcements have mattered and
quantifying these is no easy task.
The literature has gone in two directions in this regard. One is to look at
policymakers’ statements and speeches to count references to certain key
phrases to help quantify the general tone of communication. This may suffer
from some attenuation bias as this method does not distinguish between
expected and unexpected communication and therefore provides a lower
bound for the effects of communication. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003,
2005) have carried out such studies for the European Central Bank (ECB)
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and have shown that ECB communication has an important bearing on
financial markets. Lucca and Trebbi (2009) use tools from computational
linguistics to score FOMC statements. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009)
studied the ECB president’s post-meeting press conference. The ECB first
releases its policy decision and after a short while its president holds a press
conference first reading a prepared set of comments and then having a ques-
tion and answer (Q&A) session. This allows separating the effects of three
different kinds of communication (policy decision, statement and Q&A).
The second way of quantifying central-bank communication is to resort
to using asset prices. Gürkaynak et al. (2005b) use federal funds futures
contracts for later months as well as the spot month, and euro dollar futures
contracts that cover futures rates over the next year and come up with two
policy surprise measures, one for the surprise in the policy action (the target
funds rate) and the other for the surprise in the announced policy path using
a combination of these different assets. They find that while the policy action
surprise influences short maturity interest rates, long maturity interest rates
are affected almost exclusively by the path surprise, showing the importance
of communication as a policy tool. Work along similar lines has been done by
Brand et al. (2010) for the euro area and Aktaş et al. (2009) for Turkey.
Wright (2012) does a similar exercise to measure quantitative easing
announcement surprises, but uses longer-term Treasury futures.
5 THREE NEW EXAMPLES
We now turn to some more illustrative examples of the practical power of
event studies. The first is the study of a single event.
On 7 June 2012, the Swedish regulator allowed pension funds to increase
the discount rates they use to calculate their liabilities. The very low yield
environment brought on by the crisis forced pension funds to increase their
holdings of long maturity government securities held for hedging purposes.
The regulator, by allowing the use of higher-than-market discount rates,
reduced the long maturity government bond demand of these pension funds.
The announcements, then, clearly led to an understanding that pension funds
would be selling off large quantities of long maturity Swedish government
debt. The question is whether this would have a price impact. This is of course
closely related to the important question of the effects of large-scale asset
purchases by central banks, as discussed above, although it is a little different
in that it cannot possibly signal anything about future monetary policy.
The expected answer depends on the slope of the demand curve for
Swedish government bonds. With downward-sloping bond demand there
would be a price impact, but with a horizontal demand curve (as would be the
case under conventional asset pricing models) there would be no impact.
Figure 1, which plots Swedish government bond yields around the time of the
announcement, clearly shows a jump in the 10- and 30-year yields of over 30
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basis points and also the unresponsive one-year yield underscoring that there
was not a simultaneous monetary policy change. The study of this event
therefore shows that yields of long maturity Swedish securities—precisely
those securities that are affected by the accounting rule change—increased
significantly in response to the perceived likely sale of these assets by pension
funds. This is only consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve, and
therefore provides strong evidence in favor of portfolio constraints or seg-
mented markets. It is striking given that Sweden has highly developed and
open capital markets. Findings of this sort are naturally important for issuers
of debt, and also for regulators who consider mandating that pension funds
or others must hold certain government bonds. Of course, the findings are at
least as important for academic research that tries to understand bond
pricing.
The second example relates to a program that the Federal Reserve
instituted during the financial crisis, known as the Term Auction Facility
(TAF). This was in effect discount window credit that was auctioned (and
called by a different name to avoid the stigma associated with discount
window borrowing). Taylor and Williams (2009) discuss the impact of this
program on the LIBOR–OIS spread—the spread between interbank borrow-
FIG. 1. Swedish Sovereign Yields around the 7 June 2012 Announcement
Notes: This figure shows the Swedish government bond yield curve (Bloomberg generic
securities) on 6 June and 7 June 2012. These are the daily closing quotes before and after
the announcement that Swedish pension funds could increase the discount rates they use
to calculate their liabilities, reducing their special demand for long duration Swedish
government bonds.
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ing rates (LIBOR) and the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, which is a bet
on future short-term interest rates but, unlike LIBOR, with no principal
changing hands. The LIBOR–OIS spread is thought of as a measure of stress
in money markets. Taylor and Williams found that the TAF if anything
increased the LIBOR–OIS spread. But here there is a huge problem of
endogeneity. TAF was not introduced as an exogenous policy decision, but
rather in response to turmoil in financial markets, which was driving up
spreads. There is thus a two-way causality issue, which the event study
methodology can disentangle.
In Table 1, we list announcements pertaining to the size of the TAF
program and their effects on the Eurodollar-federal funds futures spread
from 15 minutes before the announcement to one hour and 45 minutes
afterwards. We use futures quotes to have high-frequency data. Eurodollar
futures settle to LIBOR, whereas federal funds futures are bets on the future
level of the federal funds rate (just like OIS rates). So the Eurodollar to
federal funds futures spread is a close analog of the LIBOR–OIS spread, but
for which we have intradaily data. Table 1 also lists our judgment about
whether this announcement represented an increase or decrease in the size of
the TAF program, relative to expectations. Although the effects are small in
most cases, it seems striking that in every single instance, positive (negative)
news leads to a narrowing (widening) of the Eurodollar over federal funds
futures spreads. Similar exercises were undertaken by McAndrews et al.
(2008) and Wu (2011) using daily data on LIBOR–OIS spreads. We believe
that the results in Table 1 make a compelling case that while TAF was
TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF TERM AUCTION FACILITY (TAF) ANNOUNCEMENTS ON EURODOLLAR/FEDERAL
FUNDS FUTURES SPREAD
Date Announcement Sign of news
Intraday change
in spread (bps)
12/11/2007 No TAF release after FOMC meeting Negative +17.5
12/12/2007 Announcement of inception of TAF Positive −11.0
12/21/2007 TAF to be retained as long as needed Positive −1.5
1/4/2008 TAF to be expanded Positive −1.5
3/7/2008 TAF to be expanded Positive −6.5
7/30/2008 TAF to be expanded Positive −5.0
9/29/2008 TAF to be expanded Positive −11.5
Notes: At the 11 December 2007 FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors decided to
introduce the TAF. However, they delayed the announcement until the next morning instead of including it
with the FOMC statement released at 2:15. Some market participants had expected TAF to be announced with
the FOMC statement, and incorrectly inferred from the absence of any such announcement that the TAF
would not go ahead at that time. This announcement is therefore treated as negative news. The other
announcements are treated as positive news. The column on the right shows the change in the Eurodollar-
federal funds spread (in basis points) from 15 minutes before the event to one hour and 45 minutes afterwards.
The front Eurodollar futures contract is compared with the average federal funds futures rates for the two
months subsequent to the Eurodollar expiration. For example, a December Eurodollar futures quote is
compared with the average of the January and February federal funds futures rates. In cases where the front
Eurodollar contract is going to settle within the current month, we skip to the next contract instead.
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introduced in response to financial market stress, it actually modestly allevi-
ated that stress relative to the counterfactual in which TAF had not been
introduced.3
The third exercise we carry out has to do with the determination of
which releases financial market participants pay attention to. In particular we
are interested in learning whether financial markets pay attention to data
releases that they think are the most informative about the underlying state of
the economy, or to data releases that policymakers pay attention to. To find
out we turn to the systematic study of financial market reactions to the release
of the employment report.
Table 2 reports regressions of the intraday change in the fourth Euro-
dollar futures rate and 10-year Treasury yields onto the employment report’s
two main components—the surprises in non-farm payrolls and in the unem-
ployment rate. Both surprises are divided by their standard deviations so that
the financial market responses are easily comparable across the two kinds of
surprises. The intraday changes are from 8:25 to 8:45, which brackets the
release of the news at 8:30 (Eastern time). The regression is run using all
employment reports from January 1985 to September 2012. The fourth Euro-
dollar futures rate is a bet on three-month interest rates in about one year’s
3Notice that the measurement of the ‘surprise’ is particularly problematic in this exercise as it
depends on our judgment of whether the announced TAF amounts were larger or smaller
than what markets expected. We were careful not to look at market responses before
making this determination to avoid reverse causality by the econometrician’s hand but our
perceptions may nonetheless be different from those of market participants’.
TABLE 2
REGRESSIONS OF CHANGES IN TREASURY YIELDS ON PAYROLLS AND UNEMPLOYMENT SURPRISES
ED4 Ten-year yield ED4 Ten-year yield
Payrolls 6.67*** 1.75*** 6.08*** 1.50***
(0.52) (0.15) (0.53) (0.15)
Unemployment −2.00*** −0.50*** −2.32*** −0.60***
(0.40) (0.11) (0.51) (0.14)
Payrolls * Dummy 3.33** 1.25***
(1.56) (0.41)
Unemployment * Dummy 0.62 0.12
(0.80) (0.22)
R2 0.498 0.465 0.513 0.497
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates in regressions of intraday changes from 8:25 to 8:45 in the fourth
Eurodollar futures contract and 10-year Treasury futures yields on the days of employment report announce-
ments onto the surprise components of the payrolls and unemployment releases. The employment report
comes out at 8:30. Both surprises are scaled by their standard deviations. Changes in futures yields are
obtained by dividing futures returns by the duration of the cheapest-to-deliver security in the futures delivery
basket. No constant is included in the regression. White standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample
period is January 1985 to September 2012. The table also reports the results of regressions with interaction
effects with a dummy that is 1 in March 2004 and later (and 0 before). This amounts to allowing the coefficients
of the regression to exhibit a break before March 2004, which was the first employment report release following
the Greenspan remarks on the relative signal of payrolls and unemployment numbers, discussed in the text.
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time, and thus Table 2 considers two points on the term structure. The results
suggest that short maturity bond yields are affected by both non-farm pay-
rolls and unemployment, but that market participants react more to payrolls.
During the sample used in the regressions reported in Table 2, the then
Chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, unequivocally stated in a congressio-
nal hearing that the Fed views the non-farm payrolls numbers as far more
informative than the unemployment numbers:
‘I wish I could say the household survey were the more accurate. Every-
thing we’ve looked at suggests that it’s the payroll data which are the series
which you have to follow’ (February 2004).
The two right columns of Table 2 address the question of what difference
this statement made, by interacting the surprises with a dummy that takes on
the value 1 after the Greenspan statement. The coefficients on the dummy
variable interacted with the payrolls surprise are positive and significant for
both the Eurodollar futures rate and the Treasury yields. This means that the
Greenspan statement made the markets more sensitive to payrolls surprises.
For example, the effect of a one standard deviation payrolls surprise on
10-year yields is estimated to have risen from 1.5 to 2.75 basis points.4
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that the Greenspan statement led
markets to put more weight on the payrolls numbers. There are two inter-
pretations as to why. One is that they were convinced by Greenspan’s state-
ment that payrolls data are the less noisy signal. The other is that they want
to respond to the series that the Fed is looking at, simply as a means of
predicting future policy actions. Either interpretation is possible, although
the latter may seem more plausible. The point estimates in Table 2 also
indicate that the Greenspan statement led markets to put less weight on
unemployment numbers, but this difference is not statistically significant.
These three examples give a taste of what can be learned from event
studies, be them one time events or systematic ones. Each one hopefully
shows the importance of isolating the right event and looking at the right
markets to answer the question of interest.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Empirical work in macroeconomics and finance faces huge difficulties in
disentangling causality. The lumpy manner in which news is released is
perhaps the most useful tool that exists for identifying causal effects in the
macro-finance literature. The event study methodology helps make use of
these data. In this paper, we have reviewed the event study methodology and
provided several examples of its power.
4The estimated coefficient on the dummy interacted with the payrolls surprise in the Eurodollar
futures equation would be even bigger if the sample were ended a couple of years earlier.
This is because the zero lower bound has reduced the sensitivity of short- and intermediate-
term interest rates to all macroeconomic news (Swanson and Williams, 2012).
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Conditioning on the proper event and looking at the right market allows
us to gain precious insights about financial market participants’ beliefs. This
is as close as we get to controlled experiments in macroeconomics.
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